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Mediating Rights and Responsibilities in Control Transactions
Abstract

There is a growing debate as to the relative merits and consequences of a shift to a more shareholder-centric
corporate governance framework. How much "direct democracy" makes sense in corporate decision making?
If power is to be transferred to shareholders, should responsibilities be imposed (and, if so, how)? These issues
have long been addressed by courts and regulators in the context of unsolicited control transactions. In its
recent Air Products & Chemicals v. Airgas decision, the Delaware Chancery Court canvassed the evolution of
its law on this point and concluded that implicit in the power (and responsibility) of the board of directors to
manage the business and affairs of the corporation is the power to determine the long-term strategy of the
corporation, including when and if a sale of control of the corporation should be pursued. By contrast,
Canadian securities regulation has consistently adopted a shareholder-centric approach to unsolicited change
of control transactions. This is an approach that is increasingly difficult to reconcile with Canadian corporate
law as it has evolved since these issues were first considered by securities regulators. The answer to this
growing inconsistency, we suggest, is for Canadian securities regulators to repeal their "defensive tactics"
policy in the recognition that our courts have become better equipped to adjudicate such matters.
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Mediating Rights and Responsibilities in
Control Transactions
SEAN VANDERPOL* & ED WAITZER**
There is a growing debate as to the relative merits and consequences of a shift to a more
shareholder-centric corporate governance framework. How much direct democracy"
makes sense in corporate decision making? If power is to be transferred to shareholders,
should responsibilities be imposed (and, if so, how]? These issues have long been addressed
by courts and regulators in the context of unsolicited control transactions. In its recent Air
Products & Chemicals v. Airgas decision, the Delaware Chancery Court canvassed the
evolution of its law on this point and concluded that implicit in the power (and responsibility)
of the board of directors to manage the business and affairs of the corporation is the power
to determine the long-term strategy of the corporation, including when and if a sale of control
of the corporation should be pursued. By contrast, Canadian securities regulation has
consistently adopted a shareholder-centric approach to unsolicited change of control
transactions. This is an approach that is increasingly difficult to reconcile with Canadian
corporate Law as it has evolved since these issues were first considered by securities
regulators. The answer to this growing inconsistency, we suggest, is for Canadian securities regulators to repeal their "defensive tactics" policy in the recognition that our courts
have become better equipped to adjudicate such matters.
Nous assistons a une intensification du debat concernant les merites relatifs et Les cons6quences d'un passage a un cadre de gouvernance corporative plus centr6 sur Les actionnaires.
Dans quelLe mesure [a <<democratie directe >>prend-e[Le son sens sur te plan des prises de
decisions corporatives ? Si le pouvoir doit 8tre transf6r6 aux actionnaires, Les responsabilites
devraient-elles 6tre imposees (et dans ce cas, comment ?). Depuis longtemps, ces questions
sont r6glees par les tribunaux et les regulateurs dans Lecontexte des transactions de contrte
non sollicit6es. Dans son dernier arrit dans laffaire Air Products & Chemicals c. Airgas, le
tribunal ambricain Delaware Chancery Courta analyse ['evolution de son droit sur ce point, et
a conclu que le pouvoir de d6terminer Lastrat6gie a tong terme de La Societe, y compris quand
et si une vente de contr6te de la Societh doit 6tre effectu6e, est inh6rent au pouvoir let a [a
responsabilitel du conseil d'administration qui gere les affaires commerciales et autres de [a
Societe. En revanche, [a r6glementation canadienne en matiere de vaLeurs mobilieres a
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constamment adopt6 une demarche centree sur les actionnaires en matiere de transactions
de changement de contrale non sotlicitees. C'est cette demarche quit est de plus en plus difficile
de r6concitier avec le droit canadien des soci6t6s, car elle a 6volub depuis que les r~gulateurs
des vaLeurs mobiLieres ont commenc6 a se pencher sur ces questions. D'aprbs nous, La
reponse Acette incoherence croissante est Le rejet, par les r6gulateurs canadiens des vateurs
mobitieres, de (eur potitique de < tactique defensive >>en reconnaissance du fait que nos
tribunaux sont d6sormais mieux 6quiphs pour juger de telles affaires.
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On the face of it, shareholder value is the dumbest idea in the world.
Shareholder value is a result, not a strategy.'
IN ITS RECENT AIR PRODUCTS & CHEMICALS

V. AIRGAS 2 DECISION, the

Delaware Chancery Court addressed the ongoing tension between board and
shareholder control of the corporation. The issue as framed by Chancellor
William B. Chandler III was "when, if ever, will a board's duty to 'the corporation
and its shareholders' require [the board] to abandon concerns for 'long term'
values (and other constituencies) and enter a current share value maximizing
mode?"' In turn, the Chancellor's thorough analysis of how Delaware law has
evolved over the last quarter-century calls into question, once again, the role
allocated under Canadian law to a board of directors that is faced with a hostile
or unsolicited take-over bid.
1.

Francesco Guerrera, "Welch condemns share price focus" Financial Times (12 March 2009),
4
online: <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/29 ffl f2-Of27-11 de-bal-0000779fd2ac.html#
axzzlJohpWhG1> (quoting Jack Welch, former CEO of General Electric).

2.

Civil Action No. 5249-CC (Del. Ch. 2011) (QL) [Airgas].

3.

Ibid. at 4, citing TWServices v. SWTAcquisition, 1989 WL 20290 at 8 (Del. Ch. 1989)
[TW Services1.
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The basic question raised by the Airgas take-over battle related to who,
as between the shareholders and the directors, could decide when and if the
corporation was for sale. The Delaware Chancery Court determined that under
Delaware corporate law it is the board that is entitled to make this decision.
This does not imply that the board of a Delaware corporation can always and
forever block a hostile tender offer. However, it does mean that a board of
directors, acting in good faith, in accordance with its duties under corporate
law, and in such a way that its actions are able to withstand enhanced judicial
scrutiny of its conduct, can "just say no" to an unsolicited transaction.
This approach stands in clear contrast with Canadian securities regulation,
which, as we will show, elevates the primacy of shareholder choice and generally
denies a Canadian board the ability to block a take-over transaction that
shareholders are otherwise willing to accept. We question whether this approach
is ultimately consistent with the powers (and responsibilities) allocated to a
board of directors under Canadian corporate law.' Moreover, we suggest that
a number of consequences follow from an emphasis on the primacy of shareholder choice. Under Canadian corporate law, the board of directors is ultimately
responsible for managing the business and affairs of the corporation and in
doing so it has a statutory duty to act in the best interests of the corporation.
By contrast, individual shareholders can generally be assumed to act in their
own interests, and, as shareholders, generally owe no duties to the corporation
or to other shareholders. As a result, we suggest that the allocation of rights
and responsibilities between shareholders and directors as set out in Canadian
securities regulation leads to the creation of a responsibility vacuum. The
board, which owes a statutory duty to and is charged with managing the
business and affairs of the corporation, is unable to prevent a change of control
that the shareholders, as a body but without necessarily acting collectively, are
able to effect, all while owing no duties (to the corporation or to each other)
in connection with that result.
To begin with, we review the Airgas decision in detail and map out the
evolution of Delaware law in this area. We then contrast this area of Delaware
law with Canadian securities regulation and discuss the apparent conflict between
Canadian securities regulation and Canadian corporate law insofar as it relates

4.

See further Edward WaiLtzer & Sean Vanderpol, "Let courts rule on poison pills" Financial
Post (25 January 2011), online: <http://opinion.financialpost.com/2011/01/24/
let-courts-rule-on-poison-pills/>.
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to the respective roles of shareholders and directors in the context of an unsolicited change of control transaction. Finally, we discuss some of the practical
consequences of the model of shareholder primacy that has been adopted by
Canadian securities regulation. To this end, we explore in particular the prejudice
to target shareholders and the systemic prejudice that result from this approach.
We conclude that Canadian securities regulators should vacate the field.
This approach was advocated in the June 2008 report of the Competition Policy
Review Panel (the Panel), which recommended, based on broad consultations
and input from the legal and investment banking community on both sides of
the border, that Canadian securities regulators repeal their policy on defensive
tactics and cease to regulate conduct by boards in relation to poison pills.' The
Panel recommended instead that the regulation of substantive decision making
by directors in respect of change of control proposals should be left to the courts.
The Panel noted that, except in rare cases, the duties imposed by corporate law
do not give rise to material differences in the responsibilities or actions of
Canadian versus Delaware directors in deciding whether to engage in a sale
process in response to an unsolicited acquisition proposal. Recent decisions by
Canadian securities regulators reaffirm the merits of the Panel's proposal.

I. THE AIRGAS DECISION
To briefly review the facts, in February 2010, Air Products announced that it
had made an unsolicited bid to acquire Airgas for US $60 per share. The offer
was all cash and for all of the shares. It was structurally non-coercive and nondiscriminatory and was backed by secured financing. The Airgas board unanimously rejected the tender offer, labelling the bid "extremely opportunistic"
and a gross undervaluation of Airgas.' Air Products subsequently increased its
bid, which continued to be rejected by the board of Airgas. Notably, Airgas did
not solicit alternative purchasers or otherwise undertake an auction of the
corporation. Airgas instead relied on the defensive measures that it had in place
to reject the bid and "just say no," including a staggered board and a shareholder
rights plan, or poison pill.

5.

6.

Competition Policy Review Panel, Compete to Win (Ottawa: Public Works and Government
Services Canada, 2008) at 76-78, online: <http://www.ic.gc.caleic/site/cprp-gepmc.nsf/
eng/home>.
Airgas, supra note 2 at 51.
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The defences employed by Airgas effectively prevented shareholders of Airgas
from accepting the bid. Air Products therefore sought to circumvent those
defences by seeking to replace a majority of the Airgas board of directors in the
hope that such replacement nominees would then decide to redeem the poison
pill and allow the Air Products bid to proceed. Given the staggered board of
Airgas, this strategy required Air Products to win two successive annual meeting
elections.! Absent judicial relief, Air Products would not have been able to take
its bid directly to Airgas shareholders.' At Airgas's annual meeting on 15 September
2010, Air Products successfully had three independent nominees that had been
selected by it elected.to the nine member Airgas board of directors. It also
attempted to implement changes to the by-laws of Airgas that would have
resulted in the date of the next Airgas annual meeting being moved up. These
by-law changes received the necessary shareholder support but were eventually
invalidated by the Delaware Supreme Court.
Following the election of the three Air Products nominees to the Airgas
board, Airgas signalled to Air Products a willingness to negotiate, but emphasized
that the then current offer price (US $65.50 per share) was viewed as grossly
7.

The Airgas corporate charter allowed 33 per cent of the outstanding shares to call a special

meeting of the shareholders and remove the entire board without cause by a vote of 67 per
cent of the outstanding shares (as opposed to a simple majority of the voting shareholders for
the election of directors). The Delaware Chancery Court considered whether this approach,
while theoretically possible, was realistically attainable by Air Products and ultimately found
that it was impossible to predict, given the number of variables. However, it did make note
of the sheer lack of historical examples where an insurgent had ever achieved such a
percentage (i.e., 67 per cent of all outstanding shares) in a contested control election.
8.

Given the traditional reluctance of the Delaware courts to redeem a poison pill, it has generally
been the view in Delaware that the only way to circumvent a poison pill (in the face of a
staggered board) is to successfully contest two director elections, allowing the hostile bidder
to take de facto control of the target board and cause the target to redeem its pill. Not
surprisingly, there does not appear to be any instance where a hostile bidder has replaced a
majority of the directors on a staggered board by winning two successive elections.

9.

Airgas etal.v. Air Products er Chemicals, 8 A.3d 1182 (Del. Sup. Ct. 2010) [Airgas (Del.
Sup. Ct.)]. In order to facilitate its strategy of winning successive proxy contests and thereby
ultimately replacing a majority of the pre-existing board, Air Products sought to amend
Airgas's bylaws to require Airgas to hold its 2011 annual meeting in January. The
shareholders approved this amendment, but Airgas challenged the amendment in court.
Although Air Products was successful at first instance, this decision was subsequently
overturned by the Delaware Supreme Court, which ruled that the Airgas annual meetings
must be spaced "approximately" one year apart (at 1186). As a result, Air Products was
unable to bring forward the timing of the next annual meeting for election of directors.
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inadequate and that the board viewed US $78 as the minimum starting price for
negotiations. While brief discussions between the parties took place, they did not
progress and were soon discontinued. Meanwhile, and at the request of the new
board members nominated by Air Products, Airgas retained a third independent
financial advisor (and independent legal counsel for the new nominees).
On 9 December 2010, Air Products made its "best and final offer" for
Airgas for US $70 per share." Air Products also indicated that it would not
pursue the bid indefinitely and that it would not contest another board election." On 22 December 2010, the board of directors of Airgas unanimously rejected the offer by Air Products for US $70 per share as "clearly inadequate"
and confirmed its previous view that Airgas was worth at least US $78 per share.12
Importantly, after joining the board and after having consulted with management,
the other board members, and their financial advisors (including the new
independent financial advisor retained at their request), the independent board
members selected by Air Products joined with the existing Airgas board members
in this determination. In effect, the Air Products nominees "changed teams"
once they joined the board. Having gained access to the board, management, and
the Airgas advisors-and being subject to the same legal duties as the other Airgas
directors-these new board members agreed with the board's original decision
to reject the offer by Air Products as inadequate." The entire Airgas board
therefore continued to maintain the Airgas poison pill, effectively blocking the

10. Airgas, supra note 2 at 95.
11.

As a consequence of the Delaware Supreme Court decision (Airgas (Del. Sup. Ct.), supra
note 9), the strategy of winning two successive proxy contests would have required Air
Products to keep its tender offer for Airgas open from February 2010 through at least
(approximately) September 2011.

12.

Airgas, supra note 2 at 106.

13.

Ibid The unanimity of the board, even after the successful proxy contest run by Air Products,
arguably contributed to the judge's conclusion regarding the integrity of the decision-making
process followed by the Airgas board. As Chancellor Chandler noted, ibid. at 14:
Here, even using heightened scrutiny, the Airgas board has demonstrated that it has a reasonable basis for sustaining its long term corporate strategy-the Airgas board is independent,
and has relied on the advice of three different outside independent financial advisors in
concluding that Air Products's offer is inadequate. Air Products's own three nominees who
were elected to the Airgas board in September 2010 have joined wholeheartedly in the Airgas
board's determination, and when the Airgas board met to consider the $70 "best and final"
offer in December 2010, it was one of those Air Products Nominees who said, "We have to
protect the pill" [emphasis in original].
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Air Products bid and preventing Airgas shareholders from having the opportunity
to tender into the offer. This was done despite the general consensus that a
majority of the Airgas shares would be tendered into the offer by Air Products
for US $70 per share absent the poison pill.
Chancellor Chandler, in a long and carefully reasoned decision that surveyed
the evolution of the law in Delaware relating to poison pills from 1985 to the
present, ruled in favour of Airgas and sustained the poison pill. While expressing
his personal reservations, he concluded that under current Delaware law "the
power to defeat an inadequate hostile tender offer ultimately lies with the board
of directors."" In accordance with its statutory duties, the board had viewed the
tender offer as a threat to the corporation (i.e., an allegedly inadequate price
that was nevertheless likely to have been accepted by a majority of the shareholders) and had taken a proportionately reasonable response to that threat by
implementing and sustaining the poison pill." As a consequence of this decision,
Air Products withdrew its bid."

II. THE EVOLUTION OF DELAWARE LAW
As noted, the Delaware Chancery Court in Airgas concluded that under Delaware corporate law the board of a corporation cannot be forced to abandon its
long-term strategy by a hostile tender offer. Therefore, provided it acts in accordance with its duties, it can "just say no" (but not "never") to an unsolicited
bid. As a result, Delaware corporate law allocates to the board, as part of its
responsibility to manage the business and affairs of the corporation, the power
to decide, as a threshold matter, whether there should be a change in control of

14.

Ibid. at 5. In his decision, Chancellor Chandler noted that, in his personal opinion, the pill
had "served its legitimate purpose" (at 11). Airgas had enjoyed ample opportunity to inform
its stockholders about its view of the intrinsic value of Airgas and to make its case against an
allegedly inadequate offer by Air Products. He also acknowledged, however, that binding
Delaware precedent prevented him from substituting his own business judgment for that of
the (unanimous) Airgas board.

15.

Ibid. The Chancellor noted that a large percentage of Airgas's shareholders were merger
arbitrageurs, who had purchased Airgas stock below the offer price of US $70 and so would
be willing to tender into an inadequate offer in order to make a return on their investment,
regardless of whether the offer fairly valued Airgas in a sale. This was sufficient to establish a
threat of substantive coercion.

16.

On Friday, 18 February 2011, three days after the ruling of the Delaware Chancery Court,
Airgas stock closed at US $64.08 on the New York Stock Exchange.
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the corporation. In this respect, the balance of power as between boards and
shareholders is tilted towards the board.
It is useful to briefly review the development of Delaware law in this area.
The use of the poison pill as a take-over defence was first sanctioned by the
Delaware Supreme Court in 1985 in its decision in Moran v. Household International, Inc." In this decision, the court concluded that under the Delaware
General CorporationLaw" the board had the authority to adopt a rights plan." It
also noted that a decision by the board to redeem or to not redeem the rights was
subject to review with a view to the board's duties, an analysis that would require
scrutiny of the board's actions in light of the "threat" posed by the hostile tender
offer.20 Thus, while a board had the prima facie power and authority to implement a poison pill, the decision to do so-as well as the decision to maintain the
pill in the face of a tender offer-was subject to evaluation within the context of
the board's duties of care and of loyalty (i.e., its duty to act in the best interests of
the corporation and its shareholders). 2 1 Moran set the stage for the Delaware
courts to explore the balance of power between shareholders and boards in the
context of change of control transactions. Through subsequent decisions, the
Delaware courts developed and refined their analysis of the different types of
threats that could sanction the use (and maintenance) of defensive tactics.
In City CapitalAssociates Ltd. Partnershipv. Interco,22 the Delaware Chancery
Court considered the use of defensive tactics in the face of a structurally

17.

500 A.2d 1346 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1985) [Moran].

18.

Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, ch. 1 (2011).

19.

Moran, supra note 17 at 1357. The Delaware Supreme Court cited, among other sources of
authority, the general power of the board under the Delaware General CorporationLaw,
ibid., to manage the business and affairs of the corporation.

20. Moran, ibid. at 1356. The Delaware Supreme Court noted the potential for structural
coercion-i.e., a two-tiered tender offer that could, independent of the price offered,
influence a shareholder's decision to tender or not tender to the offer.
21.

Under well-settled Delaware law, it is the Unocal standard of enhanced judicial scrutiny that
applies to a review of defensive measures implemented by a board. Under the Unocal
framework, the target board must show that it had reasonable grounds for believing a
danger to corporate policy and effectiveness existed (i.e., the board must be able to
articulate a legally cognizable threat) and that any board action taken in response to that
threat was reasonable in relation to the threat posed. Unocal v. Mesa Petroleum, 493 A.2d
946 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1985).

22.

551 A.2d 787 (Del. Ch. 1988) [Interco].
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non-coercive offer. While the hostile bidder had argued that a non-coercive bid
could not constitute a threat that justified the use of a defensive tactic, the court
disagreed, stating:
Our law, however, has not adopted that view and experience has demonstrated the
wisdom of that choice. ...
Even where an offer is noncoercive, it may represent a "threat" to shareholder
interests in the special sense that an active negotiator with power, in effect, to
refuse the proposal may be able to extract a higher or otherwise more valuable
proposal, or may be able to arrange an alternative transaction or a modified
business plan that will present a more valuable option to shareholders. 23

Despite concluding that a non-coercive offer could pose a threat, the Delaware
Chancery Court determined that in the circumstances at hand it did not and
ordered the rights to be redeemed. The board of Interco had, in response to the
hostile bid, developed a recapitalization plan for shareholders and was not otherwise
engaged in an auction of the company or in negotiations with the hostile bidder.
The court therefore concluded that the only function of the pill would be to
preclude the shareholders from exercising a judgment about their own interests
that differed from the judgment. of the (interested) directors and that this was not,
in the circumstances, a sufficient threat to justify maintenance of the poison pill.
The Delaware Chancery Court in Interco, while empowering a board to
deploy defensive tactics and recognizing the usefulness of those tactics in the
face of an "inadequate" offer, ultimately reserved for shareholders the right to
decide between competing alternatives. It therefore suggested that the authority
of the board of directors to maintain a poison pill was time-limited. At the
conclusion of this time period, the shareholders had the right to make their
own decision. The court stated:
Our corporation law exists, not as an isolated body of rules and principles, but rather
in a historical setting and as a part of a larger body of law premised upon shared
values. To acknowledge that directors may employ the recent innovation of "poison
pills" to deprive shareholders of the ability effectively to choose to accept a noncoercive
offer, after the board has had a reasonable opportunity to explore or create alternatives,

23.
24.

Ibid at 797-98.
The hostile bid for the shares of Interco was for a price of US $74 per share, payable in cash.
The recapitalization plan developed by Interco in response to the bid was valued by its
financial advisor at US $76 per share, although the court noted that this was "inherently a
debatable proposition" (ibid at 795).
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or attempt to negotiate on the shareholders' behalf, would, it seems to me, be so
inconsistent with widely shared notions of appropriate corporate governance as to
25
threaten to diminish the legitimacy and authority of our corporation law.

While the Chancery Court in Interco attempted to strike a balance between
boards and shareholders, the Delaware Supreme Court, in ParamountCommunications v. Time' signalled a shift from this approach. In Paramount,the Delaware
Supreme Court found itself confronted with the question of whether the Time
board, having developed a long-term strategic plan (in this case, a merger with
Warner), could be required to jettison that plan and allow the shareholders of
the corporation to, in effect, determine its strategy by tendering to the hostile
offer put forward by Paramount. The answer was unequivocally no. The board,
having developed a long-term strategy for the corporation, was not obligated to
abandon those plans in the face of a hostile tender offer and could take measures
in response to that offer that would prevent shareholders from effectively overriding the long-term strategy. The Delaware Supreme Court concluded that its
role was neither to question the board's determination as to which strategy was
to be pursued, nor to determine which alternative offered shareholders the
"better" deal. These were ultimately decisions for the board.
The decision in Paramountresulted in an explicit recognition of the risk of
substantive coercion (in that particular case, that shareholders might tender to a
hostile offer in ignorance or in a mistaken belief of the strategic benefit that a
business combination with Warner might produce) as a legitimate threat that
would justify a "proportionate" response from the board (i.e., a response that
precluded shareholders from accepting the tender offer).2 Paramounttherefore
struck a new balance between boards and shareholders, empowering boards to
select and pursue the corporation's long-term strategy, even in the face of alternatives offered to the shareholders. The Delaware Supreme Court stated:
Paramount argues that, assuming its tender offer posed a threat, Time's response
was unreasonable in precluding Time's shareholders from accepting the tender
offer or receiving a control premium in the immediately foreseeable future. Once
again, the contention stems, we believe, from a fundamental misunderstanding of
where the power of corporate governance lies. Delaware law confers the management

25.

Ibid. at 799-800.

26.

571 A.2d 1140 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1990) [Paramount].

27. Ibid. at 1155.
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of the corporate enterprise to the stockholders' duly elected board representatives.
The fiduciary duty to manage a corporate enterprise includes the selection of a
time frame for achievement of corporate goals. That duty may not be delegated to
the stockholders. Directors are not obliged to abandon a deliberately conceived
-corporate plan for a short-term shareholder profit unless there is clearly no basis to
sustain the corporate strategy.28

The end result of this line of cases, as noted by Chancellor Chandler in
Airgas, is a recognition that the power to "just say no" lies with boards of directors. Chancellor Chandler was concerned with some of the implications of his
decision, notably the potehtially broad scope given to boards to cite the threat
of substantive coercion as justification for, in effect, preferring their own views
to those of shareholders. 29 He noted that the Delaware Chancery Court had attempted to more narrowly define the concept of substantive coercion, suggesting that it only operate to allow the board time to tell "its side of the story,"
after which the potential for shareholder confusion would be substantially
lessened and shareholders should be competent to make their own decision."0
In Airgas, there had clearly been ample time for the board to make its case to
shareholders. However, Chancellor Chandler accepted that Delaware law did
not accept a more narrow view of substantive coercion and that, as a result, he
was obligated to apply binding precedent to find in favour of Airgas."

28.

Ibid. at 1154 [citations omitted]. The conclusion from Paramountwas reaffirmed by the
Delaware Supreme Court in its decision in Unitrin v. American GeneralCorp., 651 A.2d
1361 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1995). This decision again justified the use of defensive tactics in
response to the threat of substantive coercion-i.e., the fear that shareholders might accept
an inadequate offer because of ignorance or mistaken belief regarding the board's assessment
of the longer-term value of Unitrin's stock.

29.

The concept of substantive coercion was coined by Ronald J. Gilson and Reinier Kraakman
in "Delaware's Intermediate Standard for Defensive Tactics: Is There Substance to
Proportionality Review?" (1989) 44 Bus. Law. 247. The Delaware court has struggled with
this issue for some time. See e.g. Vice Chancellor Leo Strine, "One Fundamental Corporate
Governance Question We Face: Can Corporations Be Managed for the Long Term Unless
Their Powerful Electorates Also Act and Think Long Term?" (2010) 66 Bus. Law. 1.

30. Airgas, supra note 2 at 135, citing Chesapeake Corp. v. Shore, 771 A.2d 293 at 324-25 (Del.
Ch. 2000).
31. See Airgas, ibid. at 31. Chancellor Chandler concluded his review of Delaware case law with
a discussion of the decision of former Delaware Chancellor Allen in TWServices, supra note
3. He remarked on the distinction made in that decision between a board that had elected to
continue to manage the enterprise in a long-term mode (and not pursue a sale or other
immediate value-enhancing transaction) and a board that, in response to a hostile bid, had
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Under Delaware corporate law, therefore, poison pills do not have a set
expiration date. A board that acts in good faith and in accordance with its
duties-rigorously examined under enhanced judicial scrutiny-can, in the
exercise of its managerial powers, act to preserve its long-term strategic goals for
the corporation, even in the face of a majority of shareholders that would otherwise wish to adopt an alternative approach. The decision as to whether a change
of control can proceed is therefore, at first instance, a decision that must be made
by the board of directors. This does not mean that shareholders are powerless in
the face of a hostile tender offer. As demonstrated in the Airgas saga, the
shareholders, who elect the board of directors, can disagree with the board's
determination with respect to a particular change of control transaction and can
seek to elect a different board. Indeed, in response to the Airgas decision, corporate
governance debates are likely to focus on the legitimacy of staggered boards.
However, it will be the board-which is charged with both the power to manage
the business and affairs of the corporation and the responsibility to do so in
accordance with its duties-that makes the threshold decision.32

III. CANADIAN SECURITIES REGULATION
The events in the attempted Airgas take-over and the development of Delaware
corporate law stand in contrast to the law and policy in Canada governing the
conduct of boards in response to an unsolicited take-over bid, in particular as
embodied by National Policy 62-202-Take-over Bids-Defensive Tactics."
National Policy 62-202 emphasizes shareholder primacy in change of control
transactions, stating that

32.
33.

elected to pursue a management-endorsed breakup transaction that operated as a functional
alternative to the bid itself (such as in Interco, supra note 22). He suggested that this decision
supported the view that a board could "just say no" to a hostile tender offer. However, he
further suggested that the issue presented by a board that responds to a tender offer with an
alternative restructuring or recapitalization transaction is fundamentally different than that
posed by a board that "just says no" and maintains the status quo.
Clearly, as shown in Airgas, ibid., replacement board members, conscious of their duties as
directors, could determine to, in effect, "overrule" the shareholders that elected them.
O.S.C. NP 62-202, (1997) 20 O.S.C.B. 3525 [NationalPoliy 62-202]. In contrast to the
United States, where the regulation of substantive decision making by directors in the context
of a change of control transaction isleft to the courts, Canadian securities regulators, through
their public interest jurisdiction, play a large role with respect to take-over defences.
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[tihe primary objective of the take-over bid provisions of Canadian securities
legislation is the protection of the bona fide interests of the shareholders of the
target company. A secondary objective is to provide a regulatory framework within
which take-over bids may proceed in an open and even-handed environment. The
take-over bid provisions should favour neither the offeror nor the management of
the target company, and should leave the shareholdersof the target company fee to
make afilly informed decision."34

The substantive thrust of NationalPolicy 62-202 was adopted in 1986 and has
not changed since.15 Canadian securities regulators have generally applied National
Policy 62-202 to cease trade poison pills within a fixed period of time following
the commencement of a hostile bid, so as to ensure that shareholders are not
"deprived of the ability to respond to a take-over bid or to a competing bid."36
Two recent examples of the application of NationalPolicy 62-202 are the
decision of the British Columbia Securities Commission (BCSC) in Icahn
PartnersLP v. Lions Gate Entertainment Corp." and the decision of the Ontario
Securities Commission (OSC) in Re Baffinland Iron Mines Corp.3 1 In Lions
Gate, the board was faced with an unsolicited bid from funds associated with
Carl Icahn. Initially, Icahn made a partial take-over bid of US $6 per share in
cash, seeking an approximately 30 per cent ownership interest in Lions Gate
(including the 19 per cent he already held). In response, the board adopted a
poison pill. Unlike a typical Delaware poison pill, the Lions Gate pill allowed
for a "permitted bid"-if a hostile bidder were to structure its bid according to
specified conditions, including a majority of the minority minimum (and nonwaivable) tender condition, then the Lions Gate pill would not be triggered.39
As a consequence, by its own terms, the Lions Gate pill allowed a hostile bidder to
circumvent the board if it complied with the conditions set out in the poison pill.
The Icahn bid was not a permitted bid. While Icahn subsequently amended the
terms of his bid by increasing the price and extending the bid for all of the
shares of Lions Gate, it continued not to qualify as a permitted bid. Icahn
therefore applied to the BCSC for an order cease trading the Lions Gate pill.
34.
35.

Ibid., s. 1.1(2) [emphasis added].
NationalPolicy 62-202, ibid., came into effect in 1997, replacing NationalPolicy 38, which
had been formulated in the 1980s.

36.
37.
38.
39.

NationalPolicy 62-202, ibid., s. 1.1(5).
2010 BCSECCOM 233 [Lions Gate).
(2010), 33 O.S.C. Bull. 11385 [Baffinland].
Lions Gate, supra note 37 at paras. 10-11.
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Although the Lions Gate board put defensive measures in place in response
to the Icahn bid, it did not otherwise undertake an auction for Lions Gate or
seek other purchasers. As noted by the BCSC in its decision, "The Lions Gate
board concluded that it was not the time to put the company in play, and took
no steps (and does not intend to take any steps) to seek a competing bid or an
alternative transaction.""o Indeed, Lions Gate appears to have attempted to
undertake a strategy similar to that employed by the Airgas board and "just say
no" (subject to the caveat that, unlike in Airgas, the board had not indicated a
price it considered to be fair value, and Icahn could nevertheless circumvent the
Lions Gate board by making a permitted bid).
The BCSC determined to cease trade the Lions Gate pill, concluding that
it was in the public interest that each shareholder of Lions Gate be allowed to
decide whether or not to accept or reject a bid and that the imminent expiration
of the Icahn bid would, unless the pill was cease traded, jeopardize this right.
Given that Lions Gate was not actively seeking alternative transactions, the
BCSC concluded that there was no further utility to the pill."
In Baffinland, the board was faced with an unsolicited take-over bid
made by Nunavut Iron Ore Acquisition Inc. (Nunavut) for CDN $0.80 per
share. Baffinland had, in advance of the Nunavut offer, adopted a shareholder rights plan (which, as in Lions Gate, also provided for a permitted bid
mechanism that allowed a hostile bidder to structure its bid so as to avoid
triggering the pill). The shareholder rights plan had been approved by the
shareholders of Baffinland. The Nunavut offer was not a permitted bid.
Following the Nunavut offer, Baffinland ultimately entered into a support
agreement with ArcelorMittal S.A. (Arcelor) that contemplated a competing
offer by Arcelor for all the shares of Baffinland at a price of CDN $1.10 per
share. Nunavut, which had not increased its offer in response to the Arcelor
transaction, applied to the OSC for an order cease trading the Baffinland
rights plan.42

40. Ibid at para. 16.
41.

Ibid Shortly after the Lions Gate poison pill was cease traded, Icahn nevertheless extended
his bid and made numerous additional extensions thereafter. On 16 June 2010, Icahn took
up approximately 13.2 per cent of the outstanding Lions Gate shares under his original bid.
A further 2 per cent were tendered during his subsequent offering period, which expired on
30 June 2010.

42. Baffinland,supra note 38.
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The OSC granted the application. It emphasized that its focus was to
protect the interests of Baffinland shareholders and that, accordingly, "one of
the issues we must consider is whether the Rights Plan will likely result in
Baffinland shareholders being deprived of the ability to respond to the Nunavut
Offer."3 While it recognized that the Nunavut offer, which at that time was
substantially below the Arcelor offer, had little chance of succeeding unless
amended, the OSC concluded that the events with respect to the two offers
should unfold without hindrance by the pill. It stated that "[iut is the Baffinland
shareholders who should determine the outcome of the two competing bids for
their shares.""
These two decisions illustrate the extent to which the approach to unsolicited
take-over bids generally taken by Canadian securities regulators under National
Policy 62-202 is heavily tilted towards shareholder choice." In the context of a
hostile tender offer, NationalPolicy 62-202, as generally interpreted by Canadian
securities regulators, provides that it is the shareholders, and not the board, who
are able to decide whether the corporation is for sale. As a consequence, even if
the board of directors determines, in accordance with its statutory duties, to
implement a poison pill or other defensive tactic, Canadian securities regulators
will ultimately override this business judgment in order to allow shareholders to
make up their own minds concerning the proposed change of control transaction.
43.

Ibid.at para. 25.

44.

Ibid.at para. 55. After protracted bidding between Nunavut and Arcelor, the two ultimately
joined forces and acquired Baffinland for CDN $1.50 per share.

45.

The decisions in Lions Gate and Baffinlandcan be contrasted with the OSC decision in Re
Neo MaterialTechnologies Inc. (2009), 32 O.S.C. Bull. 6941 [Neo], and the Alberta Securities
Commission decision in Re Pulse Data Inc., [2008] A.W.L.D. 695. Both of these decisions
resulted in the securities regulator refusing to cease trade the applicable shareholder rights
plan. A key factor in each decision, however, was that shareholders of the target had, prior to
the decision, supported the implementation by the board of a rights plan adopted specifically
in response to the hostile bid in question. Thus, while the result in each case was different, it
can be argued that the approach was still ultimately based on a principle of shareholder choice.
As the OSC stated in Baffinland,supra note 38 at para. 51 (while commenting on its
decision in Neo):
[I] n our view, Neo does not stand for the proposition that the Commission will defer to the
business judgment of a board of directors in considering whether to cease trade a rights plan, or
that a board of directors in the exercise of its fiduciary duties may "just say no" to a take-over
bid. Such a conclusion would have been inconsistent with the provisions of NP 62-202 and
the relatively long line of regulatory decisions that began with Canadianjorex.To the contrary,
the Commission in Neo deferred to the wishes of shareholders as contemplated by NP 62-202
[emphasis added].
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This approach is arguably inconsistent with the power (and responsibilities)
allocated to a board of directors under Canadian corporate law, particularly as it
has evolved since Canadian securities regulators first started exercising their public
interest jurisdiction to intervene in contested change of control transactions.

IV. CANADIAN CORPORATE LAW
As is the case under Delaware law, under the Canada Business Corporations
Act," and under similar corporate law statutes enacted by each of the Canadian
provinces and territories, directors have a duty to manage the business and
affairs of the corporation." In discharging this duty, directors must act honestly
and in good faith with a view to the best interests of the corporation and must
exercise the care, diligence, and skill that a reasonably prudent. person would
exercise in comparable circumstances.4 ' The role of shareholders is very limited.
They elect the directors, but it is the directors who manage the business and
affairs of the corporation-not-the shareholders themselves. Often the interests
of shareholders (and other stakeholders in the corporation) are co-extensive
with the interests of the corporation, but if they conflict, the directors' duty is
clear-it is to the corporation and it requires a consideration of the long-term
interests of the corporation. As stated by the Supreme Court of Canada in its
decision in BCE v. 1976 Debentureholders,"The fiduciary duty of the directors
to the corporation is a broad, contextual concept. It is not confined to short-term
profit or share value. Where the corporation is an ongoing concern, it looks to
the long-term interests of the corporation.""
Under the CBCA, when faced with a change of control transaction, the
board must therefore assess whether that transaction is in the best interests of
the corporation. This does not automatically require the board to prefer (or
defer only to) the interests of shareholders." While shareholder considerations
are obviously central in such an assessment, the Court in BCE stated that

46. R.S.C. 1985, c. C-44 [CBCA].
47. Ibid., s. 102(1).
48. Ibid., s. 122(1).
49.

[2008] 3 S.C.R. 560 at para. 38 [BCE].

50. Also of import, the interests of the shareholders are those of the shareholders as a group
and not only those shareholders who might be interested in accepting a change of
control transaction.
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[i]n considering what is in the best interests of the corporation, directors may look
to the interests of, inter alia, shareholders, employees, creditors, consumers, governments and the environment to inform their decisions. Courts should give appropriate
deference to the business judgment of directors who take into account these ancillary
interests, as reflected by the business judgment rule. ...
There is no principle that one set of interests-for example the interests of shareholders-should prevail over another set of interests. Everything depends on the
particular situation faced. by the directors and whether, having regard to that situation,
51
they exercised business judgment in a responsible way.

V. DIRECTORS VERSUS SHAREHOLDERS
The statutory duties of directors under the CBCA, as interpreted by the Court
in BCE, can be difficult to reconcile with the shareholder-centric approach to
take-over bids reflected in National Policy 62-202. Individual shareholders
presumably act in their own interests and generally owe no duties to other
shareholders or to the corporation in connection with their actions. The board,
on the other hand, is charged with a duty to the corporation itself, which can
involve a consideration of the interests of many stakeholders and a long-term
view of the corporation.
Of course, shares are the property of the shareholders, and shareholders
should be free to dispose of their property as they see fit. However, it is important
to recognize the distinction between a sale of shares and a sale of control of
the corporation, which is the collective result of individual decisions by a
sufficient number of shareholders (who have no direct claim over the assets or
operations of the corporation) to tender their shares to the same offer. It is far
from evident that the power of shareholders to freely dispose of their shares
ought to trump the board's statutory duty to manage the business and affairs
of the corporation, at least in the context of a sale of control of the corporation.
Institutionally, the board has access to the greatest amount of information
concerning the corporation and its business. It is responsible for using that
information to develop long-term strategy and oversee day-to-day management.
Why should it therefore be subordinate to a decision of the shareholders to
abandon that strategy in favour of the pursuit of a short-term personal goal?
If the shareholders are free to force a change in the long-term strategy of the
corporation, what implications are there for the power of the board to manage

51.

BCE, supra note 49 at paras. 40, 84.
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the business and affairs of the corporation and otherwise act in the best interests
of the corporation.
In contrast to take-over bids, under Canadian corporate law a fundamental
corporate transaction, such as an amalgamation, plan of arrangement, or sale of
substantially all of the corporation's assets, requires prior approval of the board.
These types of corporate transaction are, for a number of reasons, some of the
common methods by which a change of control is effected. Thus, at least some
change of control transactions require the approval of the board in order to be
implemented, and this is a decision that the board must make in the context of
the statutory duties it owes. This policy approach, which allows for take-over
bids to proceed in the face of opposition of the board of directors, therefore
arguably results in two functionally similar forms of change in control transactions
receiving different legal treatment.
More critically, the allocation of rights and responsibilities between shareholders and directors embodied by NationalPolicy 62-202 would seem to lead to the
creation of a responsibility vacuum. The shareholders themselves, as a body but
without necessarily acting collectively, are able to effect a change in control of the
corporation, but owe no duties (to either the corporation or to each other) in
connection with that result. The board is subject to statutory duties under corporate
law and is charged with the management of the business and affairs of the corporation, but is unable to prevent a change of control. This mismatch has played a role
in making Canadian corporations attractive targets for acquirers. Indeed, we suggest
that regardless of the theoretical inconsistency of this approach, a number of
practical consequences follow from this model of shareholder primacy.
A. PREJUDICE TO TARGET SHAREHOLDERS
First, there is the problem of structurally coercive bids. Canadian securities laws
impose a number of procedural requirements with respect to the conduct of
52. Arguably, defensive tactics taken by a well-meaning board of directors that wishes to act in
the best interests of the corporation could be largely identical to those being undertaken by a
board of directors acting with an improper purpose (such as entrenchment). While this may
be an explanation for the adoption by Canadian securities regulators of a general rule against
defensive tactics, it is arguably not a justification. Rather, it suggests that a more detailed and
nuanced framework of (judicial) analysis is required for situations involving a potential conflict
of interest. One can disagree with the result in Airgas, supra note 2, as Chancellor Chandler
did, but there seems little basis to question the rigorous and thorough decision-making
process followed by the Airgas board.
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take-over bids, such as minimum timing requirements, disclosure requirements,
pre- and post-bid integration rules, and the requirements to make the bid to all
shareholders and to offer identical consideration. Securities laws impose few
substantive requirements, however, for take-over bids other than in the context
of transactions involving interested or related parties. As a result, an offeror can,
in full compliance with the procedures set out in Canadian securities laws,
make a take-over bid that is structurally coercive-i.e., one that could result in
shareholders making a rational decision to tender to the bid irrespective of their
views on the fundamental value of their shares.
For example, if an offeror bids at a premium to market for only 50.1 per
cent of the shares of a target (or makes a full cash bid, but reserves the ability to
waive its minimum tender condition), then shareholders of the target are faced
with a classic "prisoner's dilemma." If they view the bid as being undervalued,
they must nevertheless factor into their calculations the possibility that other
shareholders will tender to the offer. If other shareholders tender, but they do
not, then they have lost the offered control premium, with potentially no certainty of receiving a subsequent offer for their shares. If they tender, but other
shareholders do not, then they are no worse off-the bid will fail, and they still
have the future opportunity to obtain a control premium for their shares.
Consequently, the rational response for shareholders, assuming they are otherwise
unable to coordinate their actions, is to tender to such a bid-the possibility of
remaining as shareholders of a controlled company without necessarily receiving a
subsequent offer for their shares will lead them to the conclusion to tender their
shares rather than risk such an outcome."
The problem of uncoordinated shareholder response to a take-over bid
illustrates a second consequence of the approach to take-over bids adopted by
National Policy 62-202. In the absence of a poison pill, an offeror negotiates
with a diffuse shareholder body and, in effect, seeks only to clear the minimum
price of the median shareholder of the corporation (e.g., the minimum price
53.

Canadian securities regulators seem to give little weight to the potential for a coerced
shareholder response to a take-over bid. As the OSC stated in Baffinland,supra note 38 at
para. 39:
Baffinland made a number of submissions with respect to the coercive nature of the Nunavut
Offer, focused primarily on the reservation by Nunavut of the right to waive at any time the
minimum tender condition in its offer and take up whatever Baffinland common shares are
tendered at the time. The vast majority of take-over bids in this jurisdiction are made with a
minimum tender condition that may be unilaterally waived by the offeror. A take-over bid is
not inherently coercive for that reason.
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that it will take for the offeror to acquire 50.1 per cent of the shares). A diffuse
shareholder body is generally limited in its ability to coordinate a response to
the bidder. This hampers the ability of the shareholders, acting on their own,
to extract from the bidder any extra value over and above the minimum
clearing price that the bidder might otherwise be prepared to pay. For example, if a bidder is willing to pay $10 a share, but the median shareholder is
willing to accept $6 a share, then the bid will be successful at $6 a share,
leaving the excess value to be captured by the bidder instead of the shareholders.
A board that can "just say no" can serve as a collective bargaining agent for
the shareholders, concentrating their bargaining power within a single entity
and potentially enabling shareholders to capture at least some portion of this
extra value.
In allowing a board to deploy a poison pill or other defensive tactic in a
"genuine attempt to obtain a better bid,"" National Policy 62-202 seems to
recognize, to some extent, the threat posed by an inadequate offer and the
value that a board, armed with negotiating authority, can create. However,
the fact that a pill must always, at some point, be cease traded, vitiates the
utility to a board of employing a defensive tactic. The time period in which to
develop an alternative transaction (if that is the judgment of the board) is not
of its own choosing, as Canadian securities regulators will ultimately formand act upon-their own view as to when enough time has been allotted.
Moreover, hostile bidders, being well aware of NationalPolicy 62-202 and the
manner in which it is generally applied by Canadian securities regulators, are
cognizant of the time-limited nature of the board's defensive abilities and can
plan and act accordingly."

54.

NationalPolicy 62-202, supra note 33, s. 1.1(6).

55.

For example, in Lions Gate, Icahn timed his bid to expire prior to the shareholder meeting
called by Lions Gate to consider approval of the pill adopted by the board in response to
his hostile tender offer. This effectively forced the BCSC to cease trade a pill that could
well be supported by the Lions Gate shareholders or risk losing the opportunity for
shareholders to tender to the bid. Lions Gate nevertheless proceeded to put the poison
pill to shareholders, who ratified the pill by a substantial margin, even though the vote
was only symbolic (supra note 37). Similarly, in Baffinland,Nunavut waited until after
the OSC had cease traded the Baffinland pill to amend and vary its bid (which at the
time of the OSC hearing was substantially less than the competing Arcelor bid), increasing
the consideration offered but changing its bid into a partial bid for less than all of the
shares (supra note 38).
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B. SYSTEMIC PREJUDICE
Leaving aside the questions of structural or substantive coercion, a model of
shareholder primacy with respect to take-over bids also has consequences for
Canadian corporate governance and the overall conduct of Canadian change of
control transactions. Most critically, a board is not free to determine when the
corporation will be "put in play"-it must always confront the possibility that it
will be faced with a potential sale of control at an inopportune (or opportunistic)
time. As a result, even though a board of directors is required by corporate law
to look to the long-term interests of the corporation, National Policy 62-202
arguably creates an environment that emphasizes the achievement of shortterm goals and favours the choices made by shareholders-such as merger
arbitrageurs-that typically operate on a short-term time horizon.
Another result of National Policy 62-202 is that a board of directors can in
effect be forced, against its own judgment, to abandon its long-term strategy for
the corporation. The absence of an ability to "just say no" conditions board
responses to a hostile bidder. If a board cannot block an unsolicited transaction,
the choice of the board is to either attempt to fend off the take-over bid on its
merits (and risk the acquisition by the hostile bidder of a controlling stake in
the corporation at an inadequate price) or to try to procure an alternative and
more favourable transaction for shareholders, even if the timing of a transaction
would otherwise be inopportune. Moreover, a board's ability to exert control
over a value-maximizing sales process can be limited, as bidders can "opt out"
of the board process and take their offer directly to shareholders, thereby
reducing the board's negotiating leverage vis-h-vis third parties. Thus, a board
that elects to conduct a sale process in response to a hostile tender offer can
nevertheless be limited in its ability to achieve the best outcome for the corporation
(and its shareholders).

VI. CONCLUSION
In its assessment of the threats that can be posed to a corporation by an unsolicited
tender offer, the jurisprudence in Delaware has evolved to recognize the
threat of structural coercion, the threat posed by an inadequate offer, and the
threat of substantive coercion. In the end, the latter concept essentially embodies
the idea that it is the board of directors that is responsible for the business
and affairs of the corporation and that implicit in that responsibility is the
power, at first instance, to determine, acting in accordance with its duties,
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whether and when control of the corporation should be sold. Arguably, consistency demands this conclusion. If the shareholders, and not the board, are
entitled to determine whether to sell control of the corporation, then the
board ultimately has a diminished managerial role with respect to the corporation
itself, as it is not free to pursue its elected long-term strategy for the corporation
and can be driven to pursue shorter-term goals at the election of the shareholders.
As a further practical matter, stripping a board of the ability to "just say no"
can diminish the board's ability to counter the threat posed to the corporation
and its shareholders by an inadequate or structurally coercive offer. A bidder
can elect to simply "wait out" the board and take its offer directly to shareholders, reducing both its incentive to negotiate with the board and the
board's leverage in those negotiations.
Canadian securities regulators, in their approach to defensive tactics, have
adopted an alternative view of the appropriate balance of power between shareholders and boards. With an emphasis on ensuring that shareholders are not
deprived of the ability to respond to a take-over bid, the question becomes
when-not whether-a pill should be cease traded. This approach, as embodied
in National Policy 62-202 and generally applied in Canadian take-over bid
contests, hearkens back to the 1992 OSC decision in Re CanadianJorex Ltd."
This decision has been approvingly cited as standing for the principle that there
comes a time when a shareholder rights plan "has got to go." However, it is
worth remembering that in CanadianJorex the board had acted to allow one
bid to proceed, while maintaining a pill to block an alternative bid. The maxim
that "bad facts make bad law" may be apposite.
While the approach of Canadian securities regulators to defensive tactics has
remained relatively static since the decision in CanadianJorex, Canadian capital
markets, ownership demographics, and corporate governance standards have all
evolved dynamically. Corporate law has continued to evolve, and courts have
become better equipped to address the nuanced duties of directors in control
transactions. In BCE, the Court expressly stated that a board's duties are owed to
the corporation, which can involve a consideration of the interests of more than
just shareholders and requires a long-term view of the corporation."

56. (1992), 15 O.S.C. Bull. 257 [Canadianjorex].
57.

BCE, supra note 49 at para. 102.
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Former Delaware Chancellor William T. Allen noted long ago that the
long-term/short-term distinction in corporate law preserves the norm of
shareholder-oriented property theory, while affording directors considerable
latitude to deal with other corporate stakeholders. He concluded that
our law of corporate entities is bound itself to be contentious and controversial.
It will be worked out, not deduced. In this process, efficiency concerns, ideology,
and interest group politics will commingle with history (including our semiautonomous corporation law) to produce an answer that will hold for here and
now, only to be torn by some future stress and to be reformulated once more. And
so on, and so on, evermore.s5

Increasingly, corporate governance scholarship views director-centric
governance of public companies as being desirable from shareholders' own
perspectives. At minimum, there is consensus as to the need for more nuanced
theories of corporate structure and purpose than a simple shareholder primacy
rule provides." The more dynamic approach to poison pills that has evolved in
Delaware law recognizes a relationship between the board's duty to manage the
corporation and its role in change of control transactions. It further recognizes
the value that can be added by a board that is acting in accordance with its duties
(and whose actions are able to bear enhanced scrutiny) under corporate law.
Following the recent decision in Airgas, it may be time for Canadian securities
regulators to reconsider their basic approach to and role in adjudicating defensive
tactics, recognizing and respecting not only the statutory obligations of boards
of directors under corporate law in the context of change of control transactions,
but also the ability of Canadian courts to appropriately scrutinize and oversee
board conduct in such context. To paraphrase the OSC in CanadianJorex, there
comes a time when NationalPolicy 62-202 has got to go.

58. William T. Allen, "Our Schizophrenic Conception of the Business Corporation" (1992) 14
Cardozo L. Rev. 261 at 281.
59.

Lynn A. Stout, "New Thinking on 'Shareholder Primacy"' (UCLA School of Law, Law-Econ
44
Research Paper No. 11-04, 2011), online: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=17639 >.

